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SALT LAKE CITY CORP., 
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vs. 
CALVIN GROTEPAS, 
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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal of Appellant by 
virtue of Utah Code §78-2a-3(2) (d) , (f) (1953, as amended, 1992). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The City relies upon the following provisions and statutes: 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
1 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Utah Code §76-6-206(2), et seg (1953, as amended 1992) states: 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under 
circumstances not amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-
202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204: 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any 
person or damage to any property, including the use 
of graffiti as defined in Subsection 78-11-20(2); 
(ii) intends to commit any crime other than theft 
or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will 
cause fear for the safety of another; or 
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters 
or remains on property as to which notice against 
entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the 
owner or someone with apparent authority to act for 
the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed 
to exclude intruders; 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to 
the attention of intruders; 
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2) (a) is a class C misdemeanor 
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (2)(b) is an infraction. 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the: 
(a) property was open to the public when the actor entered or 
remained; and 
(b) actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the 
owner's use of the property. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. WAS THE CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT THE RESULT OF INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL? 
A. Did Trial Counsel's performance meet an objective 
standard of reasonableness? 
B. Is there a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the 
2 
trial would have been different absent Trial Counsel's 
errors? 
II. CAN THE DEFENDANT CLAIM PLAIN ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FAILURE TO ENTER A JUDGEMENT OF ACQUITTAL BASED ON A DEFENSE THAT 
WAS NEVER PRESENTED AT TRIAL? 
A. Should the failure to present the statutory defense to 
trespass have been obvious to the Court? 
B. Did the Trial Court's failure to enter an acquittal based 
on the statutory defense to trespass affect the 
substantial rights of the accused? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A question of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed 
question of law and fact. However, where the claim is raised for 
the first time on appeal, The Court can only determine that the 
defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel if it can do 
so as a matter of law. State v. Snyder, 220 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 
P.2d (Utah App. 1993). 
Defendant's claim of plain error is also raised for the first 
time on appeal. Issues raised for the first time on appeal can be 
addressed only if the appellate court determines that (1) the error 
should have been obvious to a trial court, and (2) the error was 
harmful in that it affected the substantial rights of the accused. 
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
3 
On April 1, 1993, Defendant was arrested after he entered the 
Salt Lake Art Center School in spite of being told by the 
management and faculty of the Art Center that he was not welcome to 
return. The defendant was issued a citation for trespassing, an 
infraction, in violation of the Salt Lake City Code. He was later 
charged by information with the same offense. Trial to the Bench, 
the Honorable Judith S. Atherton, Commissioner, was held on April 
26, 1993. A judgement of guilty was reached and conviction was 
entered. This appeal followed. 
FACTS 
In early 1993, the defendant was enrolled at the Salt Lake Art 
Center School as a student. T. at 5. Defendant was informed on 
March 23, 1993 and on March 24, 1993 that he would not be accepted 
as a student at the Art Center School in the future. T. at 5-7. 
Defendant was specifically told that he was not welcome at the Art 
Center building. T. at 6. 
On April 1st, 1993, Defendant appeared at the entrance to the 
Art Center School. T. at 8. Defendant was informed that if he 
entered he would be arrested for trespassing. Defendant asked if 
Security where going to bar him from entering. He was told that 
they did not want him to enter because then they would have to 
arrest him. T. at 8,9. Defendant said "I want to be arrested11 and 
entered the school, where he was arrested. T. at 9. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
4 
The failure of trial counsel to raise the statutory defense 
did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness because 
the manner of presenting a defense is a matter of trial strategy 
and tactics which are in the attorney's discretion. Additionally, 
the facts of the case suggest that the defense is not applicable. 
Therefore, the failure to present the defense was harmless and 
defendant could not be prejudiced. 
The failure of the trial court to enter an acquittal based on 
the statutory defense is not plain error for the same reasons noted 
above. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FAILURE OF TRIAL COUNSEL TO PRESENT THE STATUTORY DEFENSE 
WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
To sustain a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, it 
must be shown that trial counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and that the failure to meet 
that standard prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), Fernandez v. Cook, 217 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3, P.2d (Utah 1993), Snyder, 220 Utah Adv. Rep. 
36, P.2d (Utah App. 1993), State v. Hay, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 
3, P.2d (Utah 1993) , State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949 (Utah 
App. 1993) . 
A. Trial Counsel's representation met an objective standard 
of reasonableness. 
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In Fernandez, the defendant's ineffective assistance claim was 
based on trial counsel's alleged failure to prepare for a sexual 
abuse trial properly. Specifically, the failure to interview 
witnesses including one expert witness and to obtain any 
independent opinions about the testimony of one expert. The 
defendant also claimed that counsel was ineffective in claiming to 
the jury in opening statement that he was prepared to prove 
fabrication as a defense and then not introducing evidence of a 
long-standing feud between the defendant and the victim. 
In reviewing these claims, the Supreme Court of this state 
determined that the errors cited were tactical or strategic 
decisions, and the Court noted "we will not question strategic 
decisions unless there is no reasonable basis for the decision." 
Fernandez at 5. The Court also noted that "counsel's manner of 
presenting a defense, in this case the fabrication defense, goes to 
the heart of trial tactics." Fernandez at 6. 
Similarly, counsel's decisions about what defense to present 
in the case now before the court are strategic decisions which 
should not be questioned unless there is no reasonable basis. In 
the matter cit hand, there clearly was a reasonable basis for trial 
counsel's decision not to present the statutory defense. Utah Code 
§76-6-206 (4)1 requires that for the defense to be applicable, the 
1
 Although the cited defense is found in the Utah Code, the 
defendant was tried and convicted in this case under Salt Lake City 
Ordinance 11.36.130. The Salt Lake City Ordinance does not contain 
the defense asserted in this appeal and contained in the Utah Code. 
The City concedes that the statutory defense is applicable to the 
City Ordinance as well as the State Code. 
It is not known whether trial counsel for the defendant was 
6 
property must be open to the public when the actor entered or 
reinaJ ned "The Ar t Center i s a prd vate • i ion pr of i t entit- y 1" at 
1 0 Additionally, although no evidence was adduced on the point: at 
trial, it could very reasonably ^f~ c o n c e d e d t_hat the school ai the 
A,rf: Center i s - " ' for purposes of the 
statute. 2 In fact, i t is apparent from the evidence adduced r 
trial,, that people are admitted t-r r!:f- r.*h""; - • v-n-* 
a fee for tuition, and t:l lat t:I; : vJoi;i.er Has r ;.e authority : * 
properly exclude persons from attending the school. 3 T. at 5-6, 
11. 
Finally, even i: the property were determined to be "open to 
the public," the invitation as to the defendant had been clearly 
revoked Fi ir ther the -'i- i -:-.::;:.*;. • •;. - : i e i ice ciii d presei it a 
substantial interference with the owner's use of the property. 
Defendant was told not to return ; • the Art Center School due to 
hi s prd or conduct :i n the cour se "T at ] 2 1.3, 2 8 It is apparent 
from the record that defendant's presence was disruptive and that 
aware of the defense. Reference to the Ordinance defendant was 
cited under would obviously not have revealed the defense, and 
further research (or experience) would be needed to adduce that the 
defense was applicable. Trial counsel may have been aware of the 
defense and chosen not to present it, which choice the City asserts 
would be reasonable, or tria] counsel may have been unaware of the 
defense. If unaware, the City does not concede that such 
unawareness is unreasonable, but rather that there is no prejudice 
In not presenting the defense. See later discussion, supra. 
2
 It i s clear under Utah law, the defense presented is not 
restricted to public-owned property, but also applies to private 
property open to the public. Steele v. Breinholt, 747 P. 2d 433 
(Utah App. 1987). 
3
 Assuming the excxusi-.n is for a non-arbitrary reason. 
was why he was asked not to return. 
B. Even if Trial Counsel's representation fell below the 
required objective standard of reasonableness, there is 
no reasonable probability of a different result. 
In order for Defendant to succeed under an ineffective 
assistance claim, not only must the representation be shown to fall 
below the objective standard of reasonableness, but prejudice must 
also be shown. This means that defendant must show a reasonable 
probability that the result would have been different, absent the 
failure of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. 688. 
In Hay, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder. 
He appealed claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, 
specifically noting that counsel was deficient in failing to 
discover the existence of a knife which defendant alleged was 
brandished against him by the murder victim. Defendant alleged 
that the knife would have bolstered his claim of self-defense. 
In addressing the claim, the Court went directly to the second 
prong of the Strickland analysis and found that even if counsel's 
performance were deficient, it was harmless in light of the other 
testimony presented at trial. Hay at 5. 
Similarly, and as noted earlier, even if counsel failed to act 
reasonably in not presenting the defense to the trial court, the 
error is harmless because the defense is not applicable to the 
facts at hand. The Art Center School is not a place open to the 
public. Additionally, if it were, the defendant's invitation to 
8 
enter the Art Center School had been clearly revoked '^irally the 
defendant' s presence there c:l :i d i i iterf er e witl i •'.••• • •-.•.- * r ,:.-. •-. : 
the property. 
II DEFENDANT CANNOT CI AID I PLAIN' ER RC 'R FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ENTER AN ACQUITTAL 
BASED ON THE STATUTORY DEFENSE TO TRESPASS WAS Nui v — • ^ . 
An it... • i.di^e,; : or the fi rst time on appeal wi.i r;e iddressed 
only if the r;ria] coui-. proceedings demonstrate plain error. Plain 
error will be found uiu;. if: th^ appellate c o m t :.*.*** » \\) 
the error should have been obvious to a trial court; and (2) the 
error must 1-e harmful . •• ' .'- affects the substantial rights of 
A. Failure to enter an acquittal based on the statutory 
defense i s i lot err or that shoul d have been obvious to the 
trial court. 
Prior discussion had shown that the statutory defense was not 
applicable I.«. i- \ \w-t defendant's case, Therefore, no error was 
committed in failing to raise the defense, and there is no plain 
error in thf trial court's failure to enter an acq i litt .a] 
B. Er;.i_ure to enter an acquittal based on the statutory 
defense was not harmful and did not affect the 
substantial ri a! »• <=• ' •* * - h ^ - ^ f ei idant. 
As noted above, th«j sLatuLory defense was not applicable to 
the defendant's case, so the court's failure to enter an acquittal 
y 
based on the defense was not harmful and did not affect the 
substantial rights of the defendant.4 
In summary, trial counsel's representation did not fall below 
an objective standard of reasonableness, and defendant was not 
prejudiced. Additionally, the failure of the trial court to enter 
an acquittal was not plain error. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, the City requests that the 
appeal of the Defendant be denied, with the judgement of the trial 
court affirmed. 
Dated this 8th day of November, 1993. 
4
 The City concedes that if, in fact, the defense did apply 
to the facts at hand, the second prong of the Brown test would 
apply, but the City does not concede that such a situation would be 
"plain error" such that the trial court should have known it was 
committing error. 
10 
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76-6-206 CRIMINAL CODE 220 
mission of a burglary or theft is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor 1973 
76-6-206. Cr imina l trespass. 
(1) For purposes of this section "enter" means in-
trusion of the entire body 
(2) A person is guilty of cnminal trespass if, under 
circumstances not amounting to burglary as defined 
in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on prop-
erty and 
(I) intends to cause annoyance or injury to 
any person or damage to any property, in-
cluding the use of graffiti as defined in Sub-
section 78-11-20(2); 
(II) intends to commit any crime, other 
than theft or a felony, or 
(III) is reckless as to whether his presence 
will cause fear for the safety of another, or 
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, 
he enters or remains on property as to which no-
tice against entering is given by 
(I) personal communication to the actor by 
the owner or someone with apparent author-
ity to act for the owner, 
(II) fencing or other enclosure obviously 
designed to exclude intruders, 
(III) posting of signs reasonably likely to 
come to the attention of intruders 
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class C 
misdemeanor unless it was committed in a dwell-
ing, in which event it is a class B misdemeanor 
(b) A violation of Subsection (2Kb) is an infrac-
tion 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section 
that the 
(a) property was open to the public when the 
actor entered or remained, and 
(b) actor's conduct did not substantially inter-
fere with the owner's use of the property 1992 
PART 3 
ROBBERY 
76-6-301. R o b b e r y . 
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking 
of personal property in the possession of another from 
his person, or immediate presence, against his will, 
accomplished by means of force or fear 
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree 1973 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery, he 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601, or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be 
considered to be "in the course of committing a rob-
bery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the 
at tempt or commission of a robbery 1989 
PART 4 
THEFT 
76-6-401. Defini t ions. 
For the purposes of this part* 
(1) "Property" means anything of value, in-
cluding real estate, tangible and intangible per-
sonal prooenv, c a p t u r e or domestic animals and 
birds *-n~Wn mstr-rnents or other writings 
r e p r e s e n t s or err^ocying rights concerning 
real or personal prop*-T}, labor, services, or oth-
erwise aof-aining f i n i n g of value to the 
owner con^nodities A a public utility nature 
such as -jfc.ecomm-nations, gas, electricity, 
steam, or -as-ater, and ^rade secrets, meaning the 
whole or an-. Dortion ' - ^ny scientific or technical 
information, design —cess, procedure, formula 
or in\ention which :rj& owner thereof intends to 
be a\aiiaoife only to arsons selected by him 
(2) "Obtain"'mean.* _n relation to property, to 
bring about a transfer of possession or of some 
other legal!v r e c o ^ - ^ interest in property, 
whether to the obtainer or another, m relation to 
labor or services, to =-scire performance thereof, 
and in relation to a -rade secret, to make any 
facsimile, replica, phov zraph, or other reproduc-
es) ~Punx/se to decr:ve" means to have the 
conscious object 
(at To withhold property permanently or 
for so extended a period or to use under such 
circumstances tha: a substantial portion of 
its economic valu*- or of the use and benefit 
thereof, would be lost, or 
<b) To restore the property only upon pay-
ment of a reward or other compensation, or 
(a To dispose of the property under cir-
cumstances that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" 
means but is not nece-^anly limited to, conduct 
heretofore defined or known as common-law lar-
ceny by trespassory taKing, larceny by conver-
sion, larceny by bailee, and embezzlement 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person mten-
(a; Creates or confirms by words or con-
duct an impression of law or fact that is false 
and that the actor does not believe to be true 
and that is hkley to affect the judgment of 
another in the transaction, or 
ib) Fails to correct a false impression of 
law or fact that the actor previously created 
or confirmed by words or conduct that is 
likely to affect the judgment of another and 
that the actor does not now believe to be 
true, or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring infor-
mation likely to affect his judgment in the 
transaction, or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encum-
bers property without disclosing a hen, secu-
rity interest, adverse claim, or other legal 
impediment to the enjoyment of the prop 
erty, whether the lien, security interest 
claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is 
or is not a matter of official record, or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another in the t rans 
action, which performance the actor does nol 
intend to perform or knows will not be per 
formed, provided, however, tha t failure to 
perform the promise in issue without other 
evidence of intent or knowledge is not suffi 
cient proof that the actor did not intend to 
perform or knew the promise would not be 
performed ""* 197J 
11.36.120 
b. Recklessly causes or threatens a substantial 
impairment of any public utility service; or 
2. He or she intentionally damages, defaces or 
destroys the property of another; 
3. He or she recklessly or wilfully shoots oi 
propels a missile or other object at or against a 
motor vehicle; horse or carriage, operating under 
the provisions of Chapter 5.37 of this code, or its 
successor; bus; airplane; boat; locomotive; train; 
railway car or caboose; whether moving or stand 
ing. 
B. Violation of this section is a Class B misde 
meanorif the actor's conduct causes or is intended 
to cause pecuniary loss in excess of two hundred 
fifty dollars, and is a Class C misdemeanor if the 
actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause loss 
of less than two hundred fifty dollars. (Ord. 52-89 
§ 4,1989; Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code 
§32-3-5) 
11*36.130 Trespass by persons and motor 
vehicles. 
A. It is unlawful for any person to take down 
any fence, or to let down any bars, or to open any 
gate so as to expose any enclosure, or to ride, drive, 
walk, lodge, or camp or sleep upon the premises 
of another without the permission of the owner oi 
occupant thereof, or to remain upon such prem-
ises after the permission of the owner or occupant 
thereof has been revoked by such owner or occu 
pant. 
B It is unlawful for any person to drive or park 
any motor vehicle, motorcycle or motor-driven 
cycle upon any city-owned property not desig-
nated for vehicular traffic or parking without per-
mission of the mayor of the city or his or her 
designated appointee. 
C. It is unlawful for any person to operate any 
type of motor vehicle (including but not limited to 
motorcycles, trail bikes, dune buggies, 
motorscooters or jeeps) upon the private property 
of another, without first obtaining the written per-
mission of the person in lawful possession of the 
property or, if the propex i:> is unoccupied, the 
owner of such property. 
D It is unlawful for any person to operate any 
type of motor vehicle (including but not limited to 
motorcycles, trail bikes, dune buggies, 
motorscooters or jeeps) upon any public property, 
except designated streets, highways or alleys, with-
out first obtaining the written permission of the 
public entity which is in possession of such prop-
erty or, if the property is unoccupied, the public 
entity which owns such property. 
E. Every person who operates any type of 
motor vehicle upon the private property of an-
other or upon any public property, except as here-
inabove provided, at all times while so operating 
such motor vehicle shall maintain in his or her 
possession the written permission required by the 
two preceding subsections, except that, if the same 
document grants permission to two or more per-
sons, a person named in such document need not 
have it in his or her possession while another 
person named in the same document, riding in the 
same group and not more than three hundred feet 
from such person, has such document in his or her 
possession. 
F. This section does not prohibit the use of 
such property by the following: 
1. Emergency vehicles; 
2. Vehicles of commerce in the course of nor-
mal business operations; 
3. Vehicles being operated on property de-
voted to commercial or industrial purposes where 
such operation is in conjunction with commercial 
or industrial use and permission for such opera-
tion is implied or expressly given by the person in 
possession of said property; 
4. Vehicles operated on property actually used 
for residential purposes, where such vehicles are 
there at the express or implied invitation of the 
owner or occupant; 
5 Vehicles being operated on public or private 
parking lots, where permission to do so is implied 
or expressly given by the person in possession of 
such lot. 
(Silt Like City & 90) 
1136.130 
G. Violation of this section shall be punishable 
as follows: 
1. Trespass in a dwelling shall constitute a 
Class B misdemeanor violation. 
2. Entering or remaining upon property, other 
than a dwelling, where such trespass would cause 
injury or property damage, shall be a Class C 
misdemeanor. 
3. Trespass, other than a dwelling, where no 
damage or injury occurs, is an infraction. (Ord. 
88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code § 32-3-3) 
11.36.140 Placing printed matter on 
vehicles. 
A. It is unlawful for any person to distribute, 
deposit, place, throw, scatter or cast, or cause to 
be distributed, deposited, placed, thrown, scat-
tered or cast, any handbill, circular, card, booklet, 
placard or other printed or written matter of any 
type, except notice of parking violations together 
with an envelope for the payment thereof, in or 
upon any automobile or other vehicle. 
B. The provisions of this section shall not be 
deemed to prohibit the handing, transmitting or 
distributing of any noncommercial printed or writ-
ten matter to the owner or other occupant of any 
automobile or other vehicle who is willing to ac-
cept the same. (Prior code § 32-3-9) 
1136.150 Expectoration and spitting in 
public places. 
It is unlawful for any person to expectorate or 
spit, or throw cigar stumps, cigarette stumps or 
quids of tobacco on the floor of any street railway 
car or other public conveyance, or public building, 
or upon any paved sidewalk or paved crosswalk 
within the city. (Prior code § 32-3-7) 
Chapter 11.40 
FRAUDS AND CHEATS 
Sections: 
11.40.020 
11.40.030 
11.40.040 
11.40.050 
11.40.060 
11.40.070 
Obtaining money or goods 
under false pretenses. 
Cheats and swindlers. 
Using slugs in vending 
machines. 
Slugs or counterfeit coins— 
Manufacture or sale 
prohibited. 
Leaving establishment 
without paying prohibited. 
Selling or receiving articles 
with serial numbers or marks 
removed. 
11.40.020 Obtaining money or goods 
under false pretenses. 
It is unlawful for any person, by false or fraud-
ulent representation or pretense, to obtain from 
another person any chose in action, money, goods, 
wares, merchandise, chattels, effects or other 
valuable thing, with intent to cheat or defraud any 
person of the same, within the limits of the city; 
provided, the value of the property so obtained 
does not exceed one hundred dollars. (Prior code 
§32-4-1) 
11.40.030 Cheats and swindlers. 
It is unlawful for any person to engage in or 
practice any game, trick or device with the intent 
to obtain money or other valuable thing from 
others by trick or fraud, or to aid or assist therein. 
(Prior code §32-4-2) 
11.40.040 Using slugs in vending machines. 
It is unlawful for any person to knowingly place 
any token, slug, false or counterfeit coin, or 
(Salt Lake Gty 8-90) 398 
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